Juvenile Justice

by Bruce Purtzer; March 1996

            Part of our practice includes also representing juveniles charged with various offenses.  As such, decisions such as State v. Gidley, ____ Wn.App. ____, 901 P.2d 361 (1995), a Division I case is of interest.

            In Gidley, the Court of Appeals held that the police's seven month pre-accusatorial delay in referring a rape case to the prosecutor did not violate the defendant's due process rights even though the delay caused the defendant to be charged as an adult rather than a juvenile. 

            In May, 1993, King County police received a call concerning the rape of a female minor.  The suspect was Matthew Gidley, a 17 year old friend of the victim.  The police learned that Gidley's 18th birthday was in July of 1993.  On May 20, 1993 the victim initially refused to speak to the police officer, but the victim's best friend informed the police officer that the victim told her that Matt Gidley had raped her in her home.  Later, on June 1, 1993, the victim stated that Gidley had raped her.  King County Police Department's investigative procedure includes attempting to obtain a suspect's statement before submitting a case to the prosecutor's office for filing charges.  Subsequently, on August 10, 1993 the police interviewed Gidley whereupon he admitted that he had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with the victim.  The State subsequently charged Gidley with one count of third degree rape on December 29, 1993, seven months after the alleged event occurred. 

            Gidley's counsel filed a motion to dismiss based on pre-accusatorial delay.  The trial court ruled that the State had received all the information necessary to file charges by June 1, 1993, and that although the police were not negligent in their duties and did not deliberately deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction, the prejudice to the defendant outweighed the State's reason for the delay and dismissed the charge.

            The Court of Appeals, Division I, in strained reasoning, used a three-level inquiry and stated that because there was no negligent delay on the State's part which resulted in the loss of juvenile court jurisdiction, the juvenile's due process rights were not violated.  The Court reasoned that a police procedure requiring the accused's interview before referring the matter for filing was a sound practice as it prevents premature referral so that wrongful charges are not filed.

            For those who practice criminal defense, whether the accused is interviewed is generally immaterial with respect to the prosecutor's determination of whether charges will be filed. In Gidley, it is unlikely the police were concerned about a wrongful charge being filed as probable cause existed to file the charge, based upon the victim's statement, which was corroborated by her first.  This case's importance concerns what constitutes negligent police conduct to affirm a dismissal for pre-accusatorial delay.  Here, the delay between the allegation and the filing was seven months, yet the State had probable cause to arrest by May 24, 1993, some four days after the referral was made.  Following the three-level inquiry set forth in Gidley the Court's conclusion is erroneous because the prejudice to the defendant who was now treated as an adult as opposed to a juvenile far outweighed any supportable reason for the State's delay in charging.  The practice point when bringing this type of motion is to focus on the Gidley factors, particularly on the basis for the charging delay and to determine that the state is negligent.  Establishing that probable cause existed early would be helpful in establishing that the state's negligence prejudices the defendant if the defendant is transferred to adult status or by showing that the youth is now automatically declined because of the type of charge and the passing age of the defendant.

            Further, the Court in Gidley did not establish a bright-line test as to what constitutes negligent delay, or set forth any time constraints as to what constitutes negligent delay.  If seven months is insufficient, what about eight, nine or 20 months.  It certainly appears that what occurred in this case was negligent as it could not be blamed on anything else.

            As a practical matter, when conducting a hearing on a motion to dismiss for pre-accusatorial delay, one should focus on why the police required an extended period to complete the investigation, when probable cause was established, and also making certain that the findings of fact clearly set forth that if ruled on favorably, the state's delay was negligent.